

be obtained from the talks, due to the strong dislike in the United States of Communism. At the same time, it is rumored that a four power conference between Russia, Germany, Italy and Japan is to be held in the near future. The report was first carried by the *Hochi Shimbun*, Tokyo daily, which declared that the projected meet would take place in Moscow. It was immediately denied by *Tass* which stated that the report "does not correspond with reality." However, the same report is now current in Rome, according to the *United Press* correspondent in that city, who says that Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Foreign Minister, would shortly proceed to Berlin to participate in a conference between Italy, Germany, Japan and Russia. This report is given greater credence, since Berlin is believed to be a more likely meeting place for such a conference. The axis is undoubtedly anxious to show Britain and the United States that Japan is supported in Far Eastern problems not only by Italy and Germany, but also by Russia. However, it is problematical whether Soviet Russia would consent to participate in such a conference. From

all appearances, M. Stalin is apparently of the opinion that his country's interests can best be served by giving his allegiance to neither side. A complete swing either to the axis or to the Anglo-American camp is highly improbable. His game, and one that has brought excellent returns to date, is to reap the fullest benefit from the conflict without himself having to go to war. Russia is determined to maintain her military strength, in order to meet any eventuality. But it is her most earnest hope that she will never have to use it, so that, when the rest of the world has exhausted its strength, she alone will be powerful. Already every great power is seeking her favors and is offering attractive concessions in return for her support. It must be admitted that Joseph Stalin is playing an extremely clever diplomatic game. It is the game that Neville Chamberlain hoped Britain would be able to play when he offered Czechoslovakia to Hitler. As it turned out, Stalin turned the tables on him and the Russia, who was spurned at Munich, is now the most sought after belle on the face of the globe.

End of Far Eastern Appeasement

THE opening of the Burma Highway on October 17 will go down in history as one of the important events, if not a decisive turning point in history of the Far East, since it marks the end of British appeasement in the Far East and the beginning of Anglo-American co-operation to check Japanese aggression.

The closing of the Burma Highway by the British Government under Japanese pressure was the climax of a long succession of British acts of appeasement towards Japan. British policy in the Far East has been one of consistently avoiding offending Japan lest the latter should join the axis powers, as she threatened many times to do. British rights have been flagrantly violated in China and British nationals subjected to discrimination and humiliation, but still Britain had persisted in a conciliatory policy towards Japan. But just as Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement towards Hitler in Europe had not only failed to improve the relations between Britain and Germany, but actually made the German Fuehrer more arrogant and defiant than ever, so the same policy in the Far East has been interpreted by Japan as a sign of British weakness, with the result that she cast all caution to the winds, invaded Indo-China and signed a military alliance with Britain's enemies, Germany and Italy.

The signing of the Triple Alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan merely gave official recognition to a state of affairs that has existed for a long time. In the past, Japan's acts of aggression in the Far East have coincided with British preoccupation with German and Italian aggression in Europe. In making the alliance between them open, Japan cleared away all doubts as to where her sympathies and interests lie. In doing so, she has done a service to China and the democratic world, for she has opened the eyes of people everywhere to the fact that China, like Britain, is an outpost of democracy, where the ideals of

freedom and individualism are being defended against the forces of aggression and intolerance. Thus the opening of the Burma Road is important, not only because it means the resumption of communication between China and the outside world, but because it is a symbol of the brotherhood between the democracies of the west and the east.

The British action is doubly important in that it was taken with the full approval and support of the United States. As the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, pointed out, the United States has never acquiesced in the closure of the road and, in fact, protested against the British submission to Japanese pressure in June last. Japan, in reality, had no legal right whatever to demand that Britain close the road, since Japan has never declared war on China and therefore cannot claim belligerent rights.

A stronger United States stand towards Japan was immediately forthcoming in the decision of the State Department to evacuate American nationals from the Far East. The ready response to the notice served to Far Eastern residents by the American consulates has shown that not only the government but the people themselves are in full accord with the decision not to back down any longer before Japan's violations of American rights in China and the Far East.

Popular pressure upon the Administration for a sterner policy in the Far East has been increasing in Washington, while the American press is said to be almost unanimously behind the movement for a stiffer attitude towards Japan. Typical of the sentiment prevailing in the United States was the letter circulated by a number of well-known university law professors, who urged (1) An absolute embargo against the shipment of all essential materials to Japan and an absolute embargo against imports from Japan (2) Extension of all possible aid to China, including unlimited credits and huge supplies of munitions

and planes (3) Conclusion of arrangements with Britain for the use of the Singapore naval base and immediate orders shifting the U.S. fleet to Singapore.

It is understood that talks are already under way between Britain and the United States to draw up measures to impose a total trade embargo against Japan. A significant press interview was given by Mr. Jesse Jones, Federal Loan Administrator, a few days ago, when he announced that the United States was prepared to make a further substantial loan to the Chinese Government. Mr. Jones said that he was willing to do anything possible to aid China, recalling that there is no longer any limit to the amount of money the Export-Import Bank can loan to China.

With more than a million men soon to be called to the colors in the United States and the Navy ready for any eventualities, a still stiffer American stand in the Far East is anticipated in the near future. In a statement made a few days ago, Mr. Lewis Compton, Assistant Secretary of Navy, bluntly warned that the American Navy "is ready to give a damned good account of itself in the Pacific if we have to do so".

Now that Britain and the United States have committed themselves to a sterner Far Eastern policy and pledged themselves to aid China, there must be no turning back. They must press forward without delay to make clear to Japan that the days of appeasement have ended.

Chinese Tea In Sino-Soviet Relations

By C. Y. W. MENG (孟長泳)

WITH the outbreak of the European War, and with further enforcement of the quota system by the belligerent nations, the market for Chinese tea abroad is indeed no longer so bright as before. The exports of Chinese tea to foreign countries in 1939 were only 50,531,000 lbs. as against 91,767,000 lbs. in the previous year, or a drop of 40,000,000 lbs. Undoubtedly, this is a blow to the Chinese tea industry.

But, on the other hand, like China's famous *tung* or wood oil—the economic importance of which has become far more impressively demonstrated by the conclusion of the U.S.\$25,000,000 Credit Loan to China, which was secured on China's exports of wood oil to the U.S.—tea is likely to become of the same economic importance in Sino-Soviet relations.

According to a study made by Mr. E. Kann, noted statistician, until recent years tea shipments to Soviet Russia, which began as early as 1689, were enormous. In 1880, 350,000 piculs were exported to Russia; representing 17.04 per cent of the total export; in 1915, the figure soared to 1,162,842 piculs, or 65.24 per cent of the total export. Following the Russian Revolution, however, the shipments decreased until only 3,854 piculs were sent in 1938.

In the time when the First and Second Five-Year Industrial Plans were in full application in the Soviet Union when the Soviet leaders were improving the livelihood of their people and were readjusting the production and consumption in the country, there was a drop in the exports of Chinese tea to Soviet Russia, as the following table will show:—

CHINESE TEA EXPORTS TO U.S.S.R.

(1,000 lbs. per unit)

Year	Year
1928 47,566	1933 31,512
1929 49,771	1934 34,326
1930 49,524	1935 25,483
1931 32,110	1936 21,222
1932 30,702	1937 21,401

Although the exports of Chinese tea to the Soviet Union were decreasing during the past ten years, Chinese

tea always constituted a large part of all foreign tea imported to Soviet Union, as the following table will show:

Year	Chinese Tea to U.S.S.R. (1,000 lbs. per unit)	Foreign Tea to U.S.S.R.	Percentage of Chinese Tea in Total Tea Imports to U.S.S.R.
1935	25,483	76,283	33.4%
1936	21,222	54,822	38.7%
1937	21,401	46,401	46.1%
1938	32,300	57,300	56.4%

That is, exports of Chinese tea to the Soviet Union were increasing during the past four years. In 1938, it amounted to more than half of the total tea imports to the Union.

But during the same period, we note that the Soviet leaders have been taking vigorous steps in tea plantation and production, as the following table will show:

Year	Area of Tea Plantation (in acres)	Annual Production (1,000 lbs. per unit)
1935	82,300	7,000
1936	95,000	10,874
1937	107,000	13,838
1938	149,000	19,300
1939	182,000	23,700

That is, both tea plantation and tea production have increasing rapidly during the past five years in the Soviet Union.

However, when the production and consumption of tea in the Soviet Union is studied, we find that what is produced in the Union is not yet sufficient to meet the demand. One of the reasons is that both cold climate and natural environment in the Union are not so favorable to tea plantation and cultivation. The following table will show the annual production and consumption of tea in the Soviet Union:

Year	Consumption	Production (1,000 lbs. per unit)	Shortage
1935	52,221	7,000	45,221
1936	27,022	10,784	16,148
1937	33,490	13,838	19,652
1938	44,800	19,300	25,500